It appears then, at first glance, that the appetitive part is concerned with pains and pleasures of the body, with sensual things. How does he understand the difference between these two parts of the soul? He tells us that the appetitive part desires “the pleasures of food, sex, and those closely akin to them,” and that, of the appetites, the clearest examples are hunger and thirst. Socrates offers this example as proof that the soul has a rational as well as an appetitive part. The concern in opposition to thirst could be any number of things: health again (the water might be dirty), or courtesy (your friend hasn’t finished giving the toast), or piety (the period of fasting has not ended), or group survival (you and the others in the lifeboat are down to your last pint of water). The example Socrates gives in the present passage is of people who are thirsty, but – for some reason left unspecified – don’t want to drink. Therefore, Socrates would say, your soul must have at least two distinct sources of motivation, an “appetitive” part to desire the cake and a “rational” part to desire health. You find yourself pulled in opposite directions (to eat and not to eat) with respect to the same thing (the cake) at the same time. But clearly, this would be to break your diet and take a step closer to bad health, and you care about improving your health. One night, the waitress rolls out the dessert tray, and you are face to face with Chocolate Sin Cake. in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time.” He has in mind something like this: You are overweight and your doctor has put you on a low- calorie diet for health reasons. The key idea in his argument is stated at 436b-c: “the same thing cannot do or undergo opposite things. So Socrates is going to try to prove that the soul has parts, that they are three in number, and that their work in the soul corresponds to the work of the three parts of the city – “the rational part” of the soul corresponding to the rulers of the city, “the appetitive part” of the soul corresponding to the city’s laborers and craftsmen, and “the spirited part” of the soul corresponding to the auxiliaries. Since their definition of justice requires that the city have parts, it cannot be applied to the soul unless the soul also has parts. Now they want to know if this definition can be applied to the soul. They have determined to their satisfaction what it is for a city to be just.

Appetites & Vices by Felicia Grossman